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COMMENTS ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN LIGHT OF
UNITED STATES v. NIXON
A.

RichardE. Ellis*

I have a number of fundamental disagreements with the general
thrust and some of the details in Raoul Berger's paper, which for the
most part is a restatement of themes he developed in his recent influential book, Executive Privilege:A ConstitutionalMyth.2 Before elaborating on these disagreements, however, I wish to indicate that there are a
number of important areas in which we agree.
Professor Berger is correct that executive privilege is neither absolute
nor wholesale. He effectively devastates both the logic and history used
in former Deputy Attorney General William P. Roger's 1958 memorandum. 3 I also agree that there are dangers in the continued abrogation of
power by the Executive branch, and I share much of his uneasiness with
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in United States v. Nixon. Finally, as an
historian, I am indebted to Professor Berger for clarifying many of the
historical issues involved in the development of executive privilege.
Historians usually shy away from the technical, legal and constitutional
questions. Professor Berger has cut through a large mass of material
effectively, and raised a number of relevant questions. While I am not
always in agreement with the answers he offers to the questions he
raises, I am fully cognizant of the fact that many of his questions are the
right ones; and it is possible to come up with meaningful answers only
after the right questions have been asked.
My objections to Berger's work arise primarily from his preoccupation with determining the original intent of the Framers of the United
States Constitution.94 My reservations about this approach revolve
around two main points. The first, and more elusive of the two, has to
do with its theoretical and practical implications. The second concerns
the historical difficulties involved in determining with accuracy and
clarity the Framers' original intent.
* Professor of History, State University of New York, Buffalo.
92. EXECuTVE PRImVIEGF, supra note 5.
93. Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, The
Power of the President to Withhold Information from Congress, Memorandums of the
Att'y Gen., 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited as Att'y Gen. Memo]. See
also ExEcuTI E PmrVmEGE, supra note 5, at 163-208.
94. See notes 41-50 supra and accompanying text; ExEcunn PRVMEGE, supra note
5, at 60-75.
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Professor Berger is rightly concerned that the attitude of those people
who believe the Constitution can be so loosely interpreted as to mean
anything they want it to mean has dangerous implications. But he does
not seem to realize that his own panacea for this problem-the discovering of the Framers' "original intention"-has implications that are
equally dangerous. Although useful as a tactic in a given situation, a
preoccupation with the Framers' "original intention," over the long run,
surely would become a rigid, narrow, absolute and backward looking
device that could verge on a form of ancestor worship. To depend
simply or even primarily upon the amendment process 5 to alter the
meaning of the Constitution9 is not without serious problems; the
amendment process is both so slow as to be impractical and so fundamental as to be dangerous because it is extremely difficult to correct
mistakes once they are made. 97 Moreover, placing the power to alter the
meaning of the Constitution solely in the amending process increases
enormously the power of minority and special interest groups to block
change.
While Professor Berger does not go so far as to claim that it is
possible to ascertain the original intention of the Framers on every
constitutional question, I believe that in his present paper and in Executive Privilege, as well as in his other books, he has determined
the original intention of the Framers for more things than the evidence will allow. Berger makes much of -the fact that in the period immediately after 1776 there was a pervasive belief among Americans that
the executive branch of the government should definitely be kept subordinate to the legislature. 8 Support for this contention comes from the
results of the struggles between the King and Parliament in England
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries9" and from the events in
America leading up to independence, when the colonial legislatures
were associated with the successful patriotic cause while the colonial
governors were the leading spokesmen for the King's interests.10 0 As a
95.
96.
91-2.
97.
98.
99.

U.S.

CONST. art. V.
See note 47 supra and accompanying text; EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at

See McDougal & Lans, supra note 79, at 293.
See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra; ExEctrrvv PRVILEGE, supra note 5, at
15-31. Cf. J.R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH1
CENTURY 1603-1689 (1957); Turner, Parliament and Foreign Affairs 1603-1760, 38
ENG. HIST. REv. 172 (1919).
100. See L. LARABEE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA ch. V (1930); Bailyn, The
Origins of American Politics,in I PERSPECTnVEs IN AMERICAN HISTORY 52-54 (1967).
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consequence, when the first state constitutions were written after 1776,
the prerogatives of the governors were sharply limited while the legislatures were given enormous control over the executive branches. 01
If this were all there was to the revolutionary experience pertaining to
the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of the
government, then it indeed would be strong support for Berger's claim
that the Framers intended Congress to be "the senior partner in government." 102 But this is not all there was to the revolutionary generation's
thought on the matter. A number of scholars, most notably Gordon S.
Wood'0 3 and M.P.C. Vile, 0 4 have shown that American thought between 1776 and 1787 on the relationship between the legislative and
executive branches was a good deal more complicated and dynamic.
Simply stated, these authorities have concluded that experiences during
the 1780's convinced many Americans, particularly those who brought
about the adoption of the United States Constitution, of three things:
that legislative supremacy was fraught with problems and dangers; that
an effective way to limit the power of the legislature was through a
system of checks and balances; and that this system would allow, among
other things, for a strong and independent executive, an executive that
would not be subject to legislative control as were many of the governors
under the constitutions written just after 1776. This striking reversal of
thought on the independence of the Executive was justified on the
ground that circumstances in the post-1776 period were fundamentally
different from those that existed prior to independence. Before 1776 the
colonial governors were appointed by the King and were removable only
by the King; therefore, it was necessary to try to make them accountable
to the colonial legislatures for their actions. 05 After 1776, when a
republican form of government was established throughout America,
proponents of an independent Executive argued that the Governor
101. See ExEcuTIvE PRMLEGE, supra note 5, at 49-50, 51-2, wherein it is stated "that
in most early state constitutions the Governor's office was 'reduced almost to the
dimensions of a symbol."' Id. at 49, quoting E. CoRwiN, Tm PRESDENT: OFFIcE AND
PowERs (3d ed. 1948) thereinafter cited as CoRwiN]. Professor Berger, in his works,
provides examples from the constitutions of Virginia and Maryland. Id. at 49-50 n.5. See
also R. BERGER, CONGR SS v. THE Sut rmE
COURT 8-12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
BERGER, CONGRESS]; C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 176-77 (1937).

102. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
103. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMEuCAN REPUBLIc 1776-1787 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WOOD].
104. MJ.C. VaE, CONsTrrrmoNAuIsM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967)
hereinafter cited as VILE].
105. See WOOD, supra note 103, at 132-61. See also Jensen, Democracy and the
American Revolution, 20 HUNTINGTON LiB. Q. 21-42 (1957).
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should be made directly accountable to the people by elections and
should not be made subject to legislative control."' °
Not all Americans agreed on the need for a strong and independent
executive, but the proponents of this idea became increasingly stronger
as the 1780's wore on. 07 It was this point of view-that urging the
creation of a strong and independent executive-which dominated the
Constitutional Convention during the summer of 1787, finding institutional expression in the creation of the office of the President.108
This, of course, does not "prove" that the Framers definitely intended
the executive branch to have the right to deny legislative inquests
whenever it pleased. However, it certainly casts doubt upon Berger's
claim that the Framers intended the legislative branch to be "the senior
partner in government." Although at times the evidence is unclear and
contradictory, the most sensible conclusion concerning the attitude of
the Framers about the complicated question of the relationship of the
executive and legislative branch of the government is that it was very
much in flux, and as a consequence the Constitution is unclear on this
matter.
Because of his commitment to an "original intent" interpretation of
the Constitution, Berger is forced to find clarity in the meaning of the
Constitution where none really exists. He does not seem to recognize
that as enormously capable as the Founding Fathers were, and as
skillful and impressive a document as the Constitution is, it is by no
means a perfect document. There are many reasons for this.
The summer of 1787 in Philadelphia was hot and unpleasant, and
many of the delegates were eager to go home. For that reason as the
convention drew to an end they were not always attentive to constitutional niceties. Additionally, it was generally recognized by the convention that the fight over ratification, as indeed it turned out to be, was
going to be a close and difficult one; for tactical reasons it was therefore
necessary to leave some things unprovided for and other things ambiguous. 10 9 It is also clear that there were many points on which the Framers
could not reach any kind of agreement. For example, the articles of the
Constitution dealing with the executive and legislative branches of the
government are elaborate and detailed, while the one dealing with the
106. WooD, supra note 103, at 435-53.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 519, 521, 547-53. See also VmpL, supra note 104, at 158-60.
109. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 60 Am. POL. Scr.
REV. 799-816 (1961).
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judiciary is extremely brief. 1 ' The reason for this according to Gouverneur Morris, a leading member of the committee that drafted the
Constitution, was that "on that subject conflicting opinions had been
maintained with so much professional astuteness that it became necessary to select phrases, which expressing my own notions would not
alarm others . . . ."I" For a combination of these reasons, plus perhaps even a few that as yet have to be discovered, the Framers did not
provide much direction as to what the exact relationship between the
different branches of the government should be. Except for the provisions dealing with the making of treaties," 2 the President's veto power," and the making of certain appointments," 4 and impeachments," 5
the subtleties of how the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
should interact were left to the future to work out.
In pushing his case for legislative supremacy, Berger tries to demonstrate that in the years immediately following the adoption of the
Constitution "the established common law power of the legislature" to
investigate the executive was "not. . . cut down by implication in favor
of the President."" 6 He cites in particular the Treasury Act of 1789 1"
which required the Secretary of the Treasury to report directly to
Congress. Berger's interpretation of the meaning of the Treasury Act of
1789 is open to serious question. The intent of that piece of legislation,
drafted by the then Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, was
to make the head of the Treasury Department a more important officer
than the other cabinet members, who were not required to report to
Congress, and to allow the Executive Department to influence congressional proceedings in economic and financial matters."" In short, the
Treasury Act of 1789 was symbolic of the expansion of executive
influence and power and not of legislative supremacy as Berger asserts.
110. Compare U.S. CONST. arts. I & H, with U.S. CONST. art. III.
111. Letter of Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, Dec. 22, 1814, in 3 M.
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF TtE FEDERAL CONVENTION oF 1787, at 420 (1911) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
112. U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 2.
113. Id. art. I, § 7.
114. Id. art. II, § 2.
115. Id. art. I, §§ 2, 3; art. II, § 4.
116. See text following note 62 supra.
117. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 66 (now 31 U.S.C. § 1002 (1970));
see text accompanying note 63 supra.
118. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 615-31 (1834) hereinafter cited as ANNALs]; see
Meyer, A Note on the Origins of the "Hamiltonian System," 21 WM. & MARY Q. 579
(1964). For a good treatment of pre-1787 executive imperialism in financial and
economic matters, see EJ. FERGUSON, THE PoWER OF THE PuRsE: A HISTORY OF
A2mUCAN PUBLic FiNANc- 1776-1790, at 109-76 (1961).
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Whether or not any of this proves the Framers intended the President to have a right to deny congressional demands for information is
a moot point. However, during the debate over the adoption of the
Jay Treaty," 9 James Madison, despite his bitter opposition to the adoption of the treaty, indicated he
thought it clear that the House might have a right, in all cases, to ask
for information which might assist their deliberations . ...
He was
as ready to admit that the Executive had a right, under a due responsibility, also, to withhold information, when of a nature that did not permit a disclosure at the time ...
If the Executive conceived that, in relation to his own department,
papers could not be safely communicated, he might, on that ground, refuse them because he was the competent though responsible judge within
1 20
his own department.
Berger cites this quote in Executive Privilege, 21 but dismisses its
significance because the House of Representatives did not formally
endorse Madison's point of view. It is equally if not more significant that
the House was not able to force Washington to lay before it the papers
demanded on the diplomatic background of the Jay Treaty. Moreover,
when Jefferson became President in 1801 he endorsed Madison's position on executive independence and discretion. In an early draft of his
first annual message, written in the late fall of 1801, Jefferson included
a passage which clearly expressed his feelings on the relationship between the different departments of the government:
Our country has thought proper to distribute the powers of its government among three equal and independent authorities, constituting each
a check on one or both of the others, in all attempts to impair its Constitution. To make each an effectual check, it must have a right in cases
which arise within the line of its proper functions, where, equally with
the others, it acts in the last resort and without appeal, to decide on
the validity of an act according to its own judgment, and uncontrolled
by the opinions of any other department. We have accordingly, in more
than one instance, seen the opinions of different departments in opposition to each other, and no ill ensue. The Constitution moreover, as a
further security, against violation even by a concurrence of all the departments, has provided for its own reintegration by a change of the persons exercising the functions of those departments. Succeeding functionaries have the same right to judge of the conformity or non-conform119. See ExEctrvE PRn
IIEG, supra note 5, at 171-79.
120. 5 ANNALS, supra note 118, at 773.
121. ExEcTm PrvmEGE, supra note 5, at 174.
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ity of an act with the Constitution, as their predecessors who122passed it.
For if it be against the instrument, it is a perpetual nullity.
The point is that at the time of the adoption of the United States
Constitution, there was rapidly growing sympathy for the idea of a
strong and independent executive, and this idea found increasing support during the first administrations under the Constitution-both Federalist and Jeffersonian. Opponents of this development, and there were
many, were generally unsuccessful and ignored. This, to be sure, does
not indicate that the Founding Fathers believed that executive independence was to be absolute, for surely the impeachment provision of the
Constitution indicates otherwise. Neither does it indicate that the President has a right to interfere with, or prevent, the bringing to justice of
criminats. Further, it is not meant to deny the legitimacy of the concerns
of those who worry about the steady growth of presidential power that
has recently taken place. The solution to this serious problem, I believe,
does not lie either in determining the "true intent" of the Framers or in
the rewriting of history for partisan purposes, but in realistically recognizing that in some areas the Constitution is imperfect and that
the
changed conditions of the twentieth century have in many ways made
outdated eighteenth-century ideas about how power should be distributed
and controlled. The need is to look forward, not backward, though in
such an endeavor the past need not necessarily be an enemy.

122. Quoted in 3 A. BEVEUDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 605 (1919) [hereinafter cited as BEvmwG] (spelling and grammar of the passage have been modernized).

